

VN

~~CRISIS STUDY~~  
CAMBODIA 70

MHH  
MORT HAUPERIN

SA 70?  
(aka Cambodia)

Pres has not promised to take out more  
than 150,000 ; "there are the combat forces  
— engaged in combat.

"Pres is getting."

If the attack on reduced forces, he  
will escalate. He will, by using bombing,  
mining, all-out, blockading fishmarkets.

"Decisive" below — will do the same  
in bombing.

(Critique of graduation).

(He believes in "demonstrating")

North Koreans shot down a plane (8 months  
ago); Russian pilots ; (State suggested  
def. warning). Trial + frustrated → decisive  
Cons taking over Laos, Phnom Penh and

~~SAAC~~

Military — exploit opportunity ; but not Pres.




JJ 11

To make being invasion threat  
credible



"Why don't believe he had power to  
escalate."

Rogers want info about strikes  
in NVN







Start by anticipating all their arguments  
+ destroy each one

arms - dispersed military: small %.

rice - where? people's?

linkers - how many?

"body count" - Cambodians

(ARVN infiltrated by VC

warning; US opinion

(perhaps 10-15,000 VC in ARVN  
in recent CIA study)

But that SVN <sup>will</sup> ~~could~~ stay;  
suppose they stay; ~~but~~ NVA attacked;  
will Saigon get refuse support.

(N would not put pressure on T to leave)

main reason: to warn them, ~~to~~  
~~and~~ from attacking after our reduced  
presence





D. thinks NVA attacks were after  
initial SVN attacks.

G. doesn't think Rogers had any  
indication of attack when he spoke to  
Congress —

Did Laird know of attacks,  
authorizations? Or did Pres authorize,  
by-pass Laird?

All believed he wouldn't widen the  
war — increase the risks, costs, level of  
conflict.

4 missions of 50-120 planes "reinforced  
protective reaction."

"incursion"

How interpret statute, assurances, from  
the President? or his advisors?

~~James~~



Think we're dealing with someone who is  
insane. (Nixon)

(Appears while saying "Will not  
be humiliated or defeated" — disintegration —  
"I'm not going to be defeated." Struggles  
to <sup>keep</sup> ~~lose~~ control.

Not the military taking over;  
~~was~~ the initiative for this came from  
the President,  
(Abrams?)

His description of power is a description.  
His real reason — was reckless — because  
he risked buildup in Cambodia & Laos,  
committing to ~~Sihanouk~~ breakdown in  
Paris (new strategy <sup>is chief</sup> ~~line~~)

(May come with to US with Indochina  
package — better deal for ~~the~~ Laos/Cambodia  
for US, better for them in SVN.)



Cooke

(Banders, neutralizing not strong point.)

Big argument: (1) another chint state.

How viable is that answer? vs. units?

(2) What do NVN do when they regard something as an escalation; they match it. - Cambodia, Laos. Attapen.

(not regrets).  Change nature of conflict.

if they take over Cambodia, what of

CBS: TV

<sup>Fishback</sup> prison<sup>in</sup> said they had 3 days

waiting

- ARVN

Questions: What if...

Chint state...


How know 6 months' delay?



Suppose they expanded base areas  
and took Siem Reapville;

Especially

---

N. Jones: US  troops will be in  
Cambodia 8 weeks ago

Flamethrower SFRC; 51 Scouts

Marty

Border-crossing = wider war.

Very risky.

Military secrecy.

On Monday, 27 April, meeting with Rogers  
on military aid: about weapons in sight,  
don't give the aid, get involved at all.





N. wanted a quick tactical success — coaxes, etc —  
to give himself breathing space on VNZ:  
bought military argent. [?]



## Bloodbath :

ans; and provided out of the gov  
call on us for aid.  
Bloodbath in Cambodia. Reparation for victims.

the way we stopped the BB in NVN  
BB in NVN - by admitting that the military  
was for our killing people there  
were indignant - and stopping it.

our BB in SVN.

which will go on, at lower scale.

The consequence of our pretending that  
we have the knowledge, of the capture of the brigat,  
~~it is our business to decide which~~

Which shall govern (e.g. our NVNese  
or other NVNese)

, which shall live or which shall die,  
have been very grave, even tragic, for our own  
country; but for none tragic for the VNese.

discuss this in Paris.  
should ~~be brought for this~~

— But we owe apology for those we have  
compromised, who went it. <sup>though gov or multilateral don't</sup> And aid, for  
the people of SVN: ~~XXXX~~ not because we  
have left but because we were there.



Bloodbath

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I was in VN 3 years ago  
2 years ago

~~I~~ Wh in VN?



(Cambodia?)

Pres. decision

CAMBODIAN  
INCURSION

- We don't know all the factors that went into Pres. decision & how he weighed the: the alternatives, the goals, the expectations, the information. No one ever knows but the President, and Pres. never tell all at the time, or usually, ever.  
Citizens & Congress ask  
We have to meet <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ own responsibilities ~~as citizens~~ on the basis of what evidence we do have.

We do know this:

- Nov '64 - Feb '65

- Old proposal, always rejected before, even in the context of a high-level, widening, open-ended war.
- We are told there is greater - but no evidence presented, & an assumption by intell analysts that none exists, and no intell acts to this effect.
- We know great controversy within Admin - so evidence didn't convince them.
- We know the Pres refrained from any



attempt to seek endorsement from Congress,  
despite assurances he would do that.

- indispensable to military victory, not to  
withdrawal; not to "success of VVZ" unless  
that means victory.

discarded as avoiding "defeat"



12.33 "enemy" killed in 9 days

30,000 US + UNese

Plans have never assumed

2.1 million pounds of rice

1050 tons  
2,100,000

White House officials

<sup>instr.</sup>  
4793 weapons

730 crew weapons

495 large mortar rounds

6790 small rocket rds.

2.1 mill. pounds of rice

[can't grains in a pound]



1. Early, Cedar Falls - from Truax.  
Eight months after Junction City - vs. War zone C -  
Int offensive.

2.

3. People want peace - end of fighting - US  
to go away.

4. - COSVN is people.

- Supply drops  
Bombs can be rebuilt elsewhere.

- Supply routes can be re-channelled.

- No evidence - or estimates - that NVN is stretched  
to breaking-point; or can't re-infiltrate.

2.1 Within bands of rice

5. What if Com Mol goes falls?

What if PP or Sibille threatened, or fall?

Will V-Near leave?

What is fate of Lenin doctrine? scrapped?

in eye of Com?



Gygaslamir has recognized Shant.  
(Final ag!)

Plays into hands of hard-lin Chicom.

hunts Moscow - US relations

copies Chicom predictions

Reds defending bases, supply routes.



SVNese didn't call for US air support.  
Even without US air support — they will  
be going in.

What if we're engaged, <sup>30</sup> June?

[What % of supplies in area?

— est. of 60 days operating supplies

Cambodian casualties?

What if no casualties

Any est. that they want offensive in  
next year? High points.

Expanding base areas — because they expected  
— (to greater US penetration — to west  
— all the way to the Mekong,  
gain flexibility; press L.V.



What will happen in US? Polarize.

For:

If NVN are startled, tired

- think we getting out, tho keep  
th from negotiating

- But:

- NVN are not weak

- Not already thinking US weak

- reinforce NVN view of US as weak,  
ending

We didn't want to stop NVN from  
get supplies, disrupt

"Take pressure off" L.N.

(see LA Times, Lorie 5 May?  
on decision process)

expanded ARVN



~~W W W W W W W W W W~~  
Ripon Article in last Sunday's Post.

VCS — If you're going to make, you've  
got to "do something" about sanctions

High chance of avoiding mil. defeat

Will be accept "loss" of Cambodia?



Then

No. military success (Cedar Falls, etc.)

(Want to infer from decision to do this  
when

risks:

of Pros

what risks to guess against:

"Judge us by what we do, not what we say."

Student protest



Banks: NV4 expanding bases.

Base areas were opposite American

troops - to

move between troops would have  
signalled up.

to try to establish a corridor, to link  
up the areas...

Can't immediately rebuild areas - been  
building up for 5 years.

10 months before [the] same situation  
as before]

"I don't see TV out there, and I have  
little chance to read the papers..."

MM

((1))



Bunker

There's been a good deal of talk about  
- quote - "broadening"

Important thing is to create effective gov;  
an effective gov is what the people  
want

Important ~~the~~ interests of US in VN:

"the principle of allowing the Vietnamese  
to choose freely their own form of gov."

great mass of (VNese) are very quiet




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Op has shown: "Can't" do it again

- if he does, big dissent
- Pres means not to lose



- Rebels can't learn from Dems, just as  
Dems couldn't learn from French.



3 years ago

2 years ago

1 year ago

This op was not worth 44 American lives  
- or 48, to rescue the students at Kent.

Not only does it pose great risks over  
legends - of expanded <sup>NVA</sup> ops in Cambodia, Laos, SVN  
already, Attorney; Prisoner gov; expanded effort  
suggests; commitment of US to Kon Mol;



We are not talking about true "heart of the trouble" in Hanoi;

we are not talking about extended ops in Cambodia, or Laos, or NVN

No military man would use the word "decision" <sup>one-time</sup> for an 8-week ops against these war-zones.

Taken years of repeated ops with many thousands of men to find most of the supply dumps in given areas, to destroy them, to keep Com efforts rebuilding.

These ops have <sup>prob.</sup> not saved the lives of as many Americans as ~~the~~ have been lost because of the ops

The USA supplies — however marginal — will have been built up in months — 6-10 as the Admin now says, or 3 as Thier says.

Would they have been used before that, in an offensive vs. America? Not, probably without a change in strategy; and without much more infiltration. Both of these are now more likely.



~~San Antonio~~

We are making more "costly" the effort;  
that has been shown to be worthless.

Slows up <sup>possibly</sup> offensive by a few months: yet  
makes it more likely.

count of

little effect

same kind in VN:

15 Senators co-sponsor a bill to  
leave all US troops out of Indochina — that  
is a better way to protect the 280,000 the  
Pres proposes to leave in there.

To count those weapons and deliver translate  
those weapons captured into US hands sound  
is to suppose those weapons would probably  
have been  
~~be~~ used against Americans during the time  
it takes to build the road up — 3 months, 10 months.

I don't believe the Pres has seen any  
evidence that justifies the likelihood of that as  
anything but very, very low. —



Check:

- How many US consulates?
- Did Sullivan oppose?
- Did Sullivan oppose ap in Laos, as Ambassador?



with the troops available, and the  
US troops still there ~~more~~

It can't save lives <sup>or even 6 months</sup> longer from now;  
since supplies will have been replaced.

It won't save saved lives before  
then unless Com were going all-out —  
using all supplies — in next six months;  
yet that goes contrary to all estimates  
of the strategy, which ~~has~~ has been  
changed



No argument has been presented for this  
act that has not been made before  
for this same operation — I have ~~made~~ ~~to~~  
~~President~~ — I did not convince the President  
Johnson — even in the context of an open-ended  
war strategy; I did not convince Nixon,  
last year; I did not persuade Rogers,  
this year: all for the same reasons that Rogers  
gave — committed to both client states, to  
open-ended war, high casualties, ...  
protocols at illegality, <sup>including</sup> escalation by the other side;

VNZ: by French  
by MCN

Total Victory 43



Ng Ka

1. Do you favor this proposal?

2. Why?

(same line)  
US + VN

3. Will this limit of same <sup>US</sup> lines in VN?

4. Could you expand on that?

5. Why should Congress take the initiative?

students must all adults take  
responsibility  
OO



I have always blamed the phrase Nixon's War.  
If he became committed to it, we were  
committed to it for the rest of his term.

5. Importance for Congress to show responsibility;  
yet he did not message any message to show respons. for this war;  
now, perhaps no solution but for Congress to  
take whole responsibility.

Expenditure out of control — out of political  
restraints, out of restraints of respect for  
international law or borders,  
out of Congress. Last time US paid Congress report of getting a blank  
No blank check this time;

Bad judgment; worse

He may believe what he is saying to  
the students: that costs the ends on his,  
the values are big, what they want, he wants.

Of course, I want peace, & US troops to be out  
of VN — so did Ho Chi Minh.



2. Other oddities; fail to estimate.

True even of "old VNZ" strategy: too slow, too costly, too many chances for temptation to escalate, too likely to count as endlessly.

Not withdrawal, only reduction; content to Thin Down, no negot settled.

But for new turn of this new VNZ — or old Westmacomb — strategy: <sup>S+O</sup> ops on the borders, but alone beyond, heavy raids on NVN, ~~and~~ ~~reaching~~ ~~winning~~, making: open-ended.

The logic is <sup>with</sup> open-ended war: or it has no logic at all. ~~They~~ ~~Can~~ ~~still~~ escalate or retreat; he has said he would the "retaliate."

A commitment now to withdraw totally is the only sure way to save the lives of the 280,000 US troops Nixon proposes to leave & year from now.



Wang-wang Nipon.

Public understood him to be going ~~east~~ <sup>to</sup> increasingly east — towards home — not West to Cambodia or Laos or North to North VN.

He has told us US troops are leaving Cambodia — But how do we understand his statements.

By ~~what~~ how? the way they left SVN a week ago — by the western frontier? or the north — to Laos?

When will they go back?

David says we

He will not get bogged down?

Did MCN intend to get bogged down?

Won't he hear the voice of the people this time? Haven't he heard his lesson?

If he takes the mil. arguments for this op. by itself seriously, he ~~has~~ heard no lessons.

~~If~~ If he misread the public reaction to this op, & its style, so badly, how can we believe our wishes & plans are getting through to him, or influence him?



~~xxxxxx~~ Our "concern" is the quickness  
- which <sup>the press</sup> SEA sit.

The Emperor has taken off his clothes.

Kill for Peace

Ion Mol will find what it was  
to call -

People's responsibility to press home.

(rationale for  
vs. sternness of decision

[ 10,000 dentures;

~~Major~~ "decided to press the legality of  
taking away a invitation.

Pres. has equated to low invasion of Greek's  
Tanks: Dages, not of Munich but of blitzkrieg.

"Forgot about the map..."

Contract of invasion to upper action  
(like Tet; like bombing).

What Pres' don't know, from still: What will  
come next in others; how he acts last.



to Sullivan

Was the Cambodian Gov. consulted on the decision to enter the country with US troops?

1. Were you involved directly?  
(Did you know of proposal?)

Ambass. Sullivan — if you did not agree

2. did you recommend, or agree with the rec. to send US units into Cambodia?

3. If you ~~did~~ felt the arguments <sup>for this</sup> inadequate, would you feel free to tell us?

→ 4.

5. What was your attitude, as Ambass. to Laos, to revealing the US role in Laos, or making open <sup>US ground</sup> attacks on the Laotian sanctuaries?

6. Why do these same attitudes not apply to Cambodia — which is ~~treated~~ covered also in the Geneva Accords of 1954?

~~What~~ What will we do if

4. do there any evidence of a Com buildup of men or supplies in the Cambodian border areas in the last several months?

7. What will we do if the Lon Nol gov is about to fall, from Com pressure?



## Cross-Exam

1. Secret info : sure : by past experience,  
largely wrong.

Also, secret notions ; part of the job of  
SA's, as Ambrose Bierce well knows, is  
to prepare communist cover stories and  
lies, as to plans, info, notions,

The now cloudy held, the less likely  
on thy to stand up to open scrutiny + questioning.  
But we can say effects.

2. <sup>(secret)</sup> Blame, reasons for bad policies.

Purpose to give Presidential decisions <sup>or assertions</sup>  
in shadowing the benefit of any doubts,  
after the record of the last 4 Presidents there.

A Pres. who wants public confidence in  
his policy ~~to~~ not to leave a lot of doubts



1. Pres has said

Is it worthable in saving lives?

Should SVN

Is there military justification for this operation.

2. Why not?

For some reasons that have led two Presidents, including this one, to reject it every time it has been proposed... to call this "decision"?

3. Is there a risk?

Risks of escalation by Com:

(new strategy  
across - Central  
Control in Central  
in Laos)

Risk of future Pres actions

We have warned <sup>NVA</sup> us that any of these will lead to escalation... full  
use of strategy. Dying - and killing.

4. What should US be doing in VN.

Getting out of VN. <sup>we, in</sup> Pres should  
decide, to ~~and~~ <sup>total</sup> withdrawal  
On Congress: share responsibility.



Nixon Admin started with a fetish for  
consistency of plans, budgets, forces, etc.

[as in SA? Or is there also emphasis on  
consistency of policies, in different regions,  
subjects...]

Rationale for Military Assistance hasn't changed  
since Dulles (or...?) (Acheson?): building up  
indigenous forces that can't be relied on, yet  
commit us.

"Containment of China" — that genie starts  
in a pretty big bottle.

2 1/2 years: (1) a buildup in Europe against Warsaw Pact  
(2)

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Many the men in Korea and desire by  
commanders to use them against NKoreans, not  
just Chinese.